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Essay

Comment on Griffith’s Deal Insurance:
The Continuing Scramble Among
Professionals
Abraham J.B. Cable†
In his recent article, Professor Sean Griffith observes a substantial development in the M&A market. Increasingly, buyers
and sellers replace traditional deal terms with an insurance
product—representation and warranty insurance (“RWI”). This
essay considers how this new product and the insurance professionals who sell and underwrite it affect the traditional role of
M&A lawyers. It concludes that RWI, in its present form, does not
substantially encroach on the traditional role of M&A lawyers.
But it also notes that representations and warranties are ripe for
technological innovation and that insurance professionals may
be better positioned then lawyers to seize the opportunity.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly 35 years ago, Professor Ronald Gilson provided the
seminal account of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) lawyers.1
Gilson sought to move beyond a caricature of deal lawyers as
value-destroying nitpickers arguing over comma placement. Instead, he portrayed them as “transaction-cost engineers” who design processes and agreements that help buyers and sellers overcome obstacles to mutually beneficial transactions.2 Though
legal scholars have critiqued and refined Gilson’s formulation,3
† Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. For
helpful comments, the author thanks Spencer Williams, Sean Griffith, and participants in the 2019 BYU Winter Deals Conference and the summer 2019 Bay
Area Corporate Law Workshops.
1. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 267–94 (1984).
2. See id. at 253–56.
3. For alternative depictions of deal lawyers, see generally Elisabeth De
Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 41 J.
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it remains foundational in legal scholarship and legal education.4
In his recent article, Professor Sean Griffith describes an
important inflection point in transaction-cost engineering, warranting reflection on the central position of lawyers in M&A
transactions.5 After all, Gilson focused his analysis largely on
representations and warranties (together, “reps”)6 and related
indemnities in a typical acquisition agreement.7 Today, in nearly
a third of private-company acquisitions, buyers and sellers substantially or completely replace liability under these provisions
with an insurance product—representation and warranty insurance (RWI).8 This product was obscure just five years ago.9 As
CORP. L. 393 (2015) (emphasizing law firm knowledge of market information);
George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW.
279 (2009); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L.
REV. 15 (1995) (emphasizing reputation brokering); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 486
(2007) (emphasizing reduction of regulatory costs).
4. See John C. Coates IV, Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence
from M&A and Policy Implications, 5 (May 17, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133343 [https://perma.cc/677P-NX22] (describing
Gilson’s account as “seminal”).
5. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation & Warranty Insurance in Mergers and Acquisitions, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1839 (2020).
6. I follow Griffith’s lead in referring to representations and warranties by
the more manageable term “reps.” See id. at 1841.
7. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 267–94.
8. An American Bar Association deal study reported that acquisition
agreements for 30% of private company acquisitions by public companies (i.e.,
strategic buyers) referenced RWI. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRIVATE
TARGET MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS DEAL POINTS STUDY (2017). Materials
from AON Corporation, a prominent insurance broker, suggest that use in private equity transactions is substantially higher. AON CORPORATION, M&A
TRANSACTION SOLUTIONS: RISK IN REVIEW (2018), https://www.aon.com/
getmedia/0c91accf-ab1e-44a1-9587-4bfa3a01ce1c/Aon-Risk-in-Review-Report2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/R46N-RE7H] (estimating that 75% of private equity deals use RWI).
9. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1877 (showing a pronounced increase in
RWI adoption starting in 2014); see also AIG, WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE DEAL
CLOSES? WARRANTY AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE GLOBAL CLAIMS STUDY (2016),
https://www.aiginsurance.nl/content/dam/aig/emea/belgium/documents/reports
-and-white-papers/m_and_a_what_happens_after_the_deal_closes.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8XSY-FNPC] (stating that the insurance company AIG has issued
RWI policies since the 1990s but has seen rapid growth in recent years); Hamed
Meshki & Brandon Vongsawad, Why You Need M&A Reps & Warranties Insurance, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (July 31, 2013), https://www.kirkland.com/
publications/article/2013/07/why-you-need-ma-reps-and-warranties-insurance
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Griffith details, the emergence of RWI marks an important refinement, or re-engineering, of deal design as buyers and sellers
no longer just allocate risk between themselves but instead offload risk to a third party for a fixed price.10 As Griffith explores,
this outsourcing of risk raises important questions about the incentives RWI creates for transacting parties11 and the efficiency
and sustainability of this new insurance market.12
This essay picks up where Griffith leaves off, returning to
Gilson’s motivating question about why deal lawyers, instead of
other advisors, design M&A transactions. Gilson’s account,
though favorable, was not laudatory in tone. He situated lawyers
in a “scramble among professionals” and noted that the legal profession’s preeminent role in deal making was vulnerable because
the engineering function is not inherently legal.13 RWI now interjects new species of deal professionals into the mix—insurance brokers and underwriters (together, “insurance professionals”).
After a brief literature review, this essay describes the anatomy of a typical insured deal. This description supplements Griffith’s account by focusing on professional roles. It is based on a
mix of publicly available practitioner materials, materials provided by insurance brokers, and original interviews with M&A
lawyers, general counsel, and insurance professionals.14 By this
[https://perma.cc/G7ZW-YDLF] (stating that RWI existed as early as the 1990s,
but was used reactively when negotiations around indemnification obligations
failed); Joseph Verdesca et al., Representations and Warranties Insurance: What
Every Buyer and Seller Needs to Know, LEXISNEXIS: CORP. L. ADVISORY (2016),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2016/01/15/representations-and-warranties-insurance-whatevery-buyer-and-seller-needs-to-know.aspx[https://perma.cc/M8KUPPTW](stating that, until “a few years ago,” RWI was “the poor stepchild” of
insurance policies); George H. Wang, Representation and Warranties Insurance
in Cross-Border Transactions, HAYNESBOON (April 29, 2015), https://www
.haynesboone.com/alerts/representation-and-warranty-insurance-in-cross
-border-transactions [https://perma.cc/M4MU-E7JC] (stating that RWI was
available in the 1990s, but was used only when negotiations faltered).
10. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1842 (“The fact that transacting parties
now commonly avoid liability for misinformation by shifting the risk to an insurer thus comes as an affront to the standard account of M&A contracting.”).
11. See id. at 1872–75(discussing problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard).
12. See id. at 1886–920 (manuscript at 32–55) (on file with the author) (considering why transacting parties buy RWI and why insurers sell RWI).
13. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 244.
14. I have completed 18 semi-structured interviews. I located interviewees

78

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[104:75

account, the key attribute of RWI in its present state is deference
to existing M&A process. Insurers rely primarily on buyers,
sellers, and their lawyers to vigorously negotiate suitable reps
and to conduct suitable diligence on the seller’s operations,
thereby limiting disruption of the M&A ecosystem.15 In this
form, the current state of RWI speaks to the durability of the
legal profession’s central role in M&A transactions.
But there is a caveat. Reps seem ripe for technological innovation in the form of sophisticated data analysis, and insurers
may be better situated than law firms to lead these efforts.16
Armed with more predictive power, insurers might be more assertive in dictating acquisition agreement terms and diligence
practices.17 In short, RWI is worth keeping an eye on.
I. M&A LAWYERS
Since Gilson initially posed his question about the value of
transactional lawyers, a significant amount of literature has followed. This body of work has generally expanded on Gilson’s initial formulation by identifying additional functions and attributes of deal lawyers. Before turning to RWI as a case study, it is
helpful to briefly summarize this literature.
A. FUNCTIONS
As a first step in understanding why lawyers play a central
role in M&A transactions, this subsection starts with a threshold
question: what are the basic functions of an M&A lawyer?
1. Agreement Design (Transaction-Cost Engineering)
Gilson’s account focused on the role of lawyers in designing
(drafting and negotiating) acquisition agreements. His analysis
was based largely on the reps and associated indemnities
through which sellers make promises about the condition of the
target business.18 These provisions continue to be prominent in
through professional connections, internet searches, and referrals by interviewees. The current occupations of the interviewees are: M&A lawyer at law firm
(3), RWI specialist at law firm (2), general counsel at frequent buyer or seller
(2), RWI broker (6), and underwriter (5). A substantial majority of interviewees
began their careers as M&A lawyers at law firms. See infra note 169.
15. See infra Part II.B.3 & 4 (describing negotiation of representations and
warranties and due diligence in insured deals).
16. See infra III.B (discussing the potential for technological innovation).
17. See id.
18. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 267–94.
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scholarly portrayals of deal lawyers. Most basically, they occupy
a large percentage of a typical acquisition agreement—arguably
the most tangible evidence or “tracks” from a deal lawyers’
work.19 They also soak up a large percentage of a deal lawyer’s
time.20 In fact, the unfavorable view that Gilson sought to debunk can likely be traced to the tough sledding of negotiating
these detailed descriptions of the seller’s business, scheduling
exceptions, and specifying limits to related liabilities. Commentators continue to see these lengthy provisions as fertile ground
for inefficient “churning” by deal lawyers.21
If one steps back, however, and looks at the broader M&A
process, reps appear as a kind of scaffolding for a more valuable
project of information exchange and production. In economic terminology, M&A transactions must overcome pervasive informational asymmetry. Sellers tend to know more about certain aspects of their business than buyers.22 Representations and
warranties give the seller an opportunity to provide a systematic
and credible description of the business and its risks. This account is credible in part because a seller agrees to be liable for
inaccuracies through the agreement’s indemnification clause.23
The engineering does not stop with the reps. Limits on indemnification, various purchase price adjustments, and requirements for third-party reports can all be understood as mitigating
information asymmetry, differences in risk preference, and valuation difficulties that might otherwise impede mutually beneficial transactions.24
19. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence
from Twenty Years of Deals 49 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 333/2016, 2016) (reporting results of an empirical study of publicly
available acquisition agreements); Gilson, supra note 1, at 257, 270.
20. See id. at 270.
21. See, e.g., Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution
of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2017).
22. See Coates, supra note 4, at 13 (“The target’s prior managers can be
expected to have better information about [risks associated with the target’s
business]”); Gilson, supra note 1, at 269 (“[A]s a simple result of its prior operation of the business, the seller will already have large amounts of information
concerning the business that the buyer does not have, but would like to acquire.”).
23. Coates, supra note 4, at 10 (discussing how a combination of representations and post-closing indemnification reduce information asymmetry); Gilson, supra note 1, at 281–82 (describing how post-closing liability helps verify
information provided by the seller).
24. For a recent and thorough review of literature providing economic analysis of M&A acquisition agreements, see Coates, supra note 4, at 3–9.
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2. Additional Functions
Professor Stephen Schwarcz pushed back somewhat on Gilson’s formulation by restoring more squarely legal work to the
core of transactional lawyering. Through survey research,
Schwarcz suggested that legal compliance is the primary function of deal lawyers.25 Lawyers must be well-versed in some regulatory schemes (corporate approval requirements) and alert to
others (banking regulation, antitrust, tax, etc.). Guiding the deal
through these regulations is a specialized field of compliance—
what Schwarcz deemed “transaction-regulatory” work.26 According to Schwarcz’s research, both lawyers and clients view this
transaction-regulatory work as more important than designing
deals to reduce transaction costs between buyer and seller.27
Commentators have also expanded the list of nonlegal functions performed by deal lawyers. For example, law firms provide
substantial project-management services.28 Bringing a transaction to completion requires coordinating due diligence, the involvement of several different experts (auditors and the like),
and other logistical matters. In other words, lawyers do not just
negotiate the terms of merger agreements—they help execute
them.
Sometimes lawyers absorb transactional risk—another key
function. Most explicitly, they offer legal opinions to transaction
counterparties. For example, a lawyer for the seller might deliver an opinion to the buyer regarding proper corporate approval of the transaction, the seller’s capital structure, and other
customary matters, thereby serving as a kind of insurer against
those risks.29

25. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 501–02 (reporting survey results).
26. See id. at 492–93, 501–02 (defining transaction-regulatory work).
27. See id. at 501–02 (reporting survey results).
28. See Joseph M. Green, Legaltech and the Future of Startup Lawyering,
in MAPPING LEGAL INNOVATION: TRENDS & PERSPECTIVES 7–8 (A. Masson, D.
Orozco & G. Robinson, eds.) (forthcoming) (identifying project management as
a core function of transactional lawyers).
29. See Heather M. Field, Tax Lawyers as Tax Insurance, 60 WM & MARY
L. REV. 2111, 2114 (2019) (considering the extent to which transactional tax
lawyers serve an insurance function when issuing tax opinions and concluding
that “Transactional tax lawyers, by rendering tax opinions, provide an element
of insurance to clients”); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as
Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley,
21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 695 (1996) (discussing how transactional lawyers
in Silicon Valley assume risk for client representations through legal opinions).

2020]

THE SCRAMBLE

81

B. ATTRIBUTES
This same literature tries to explain why lawyers, rather
than other kinds of advisors, serve these varied functions. In
some instances, the answer to that question is not obvious. For
example, Gilson noted that the design function could be performed by other advisors (bankers or accountants) who are angling for a “larger piece of the action.”30 Of course, a merger is a
legal act governed by a statute, a merger agreement can give rise
to remedies defined by contract law, and the agreement touches
on a wide range of technical legal specialties such as tax, employment, and environmental law. But the design function that
Gilson describes as the deal lawyer’s core competency is not itself
inherently legal in the sense of requiring traditional legal education or licensing.
Since there is little evidence that M&A lawyers have substantially given way to other deal professionals,31 there must be
something about deal lawyers that accounts for their persistence
in nonlegal functions. In fact, the literature describes a number
of attributes that might make lawyers hard to dislodge: economies of scope, reputation, and market knowledge.32
Lawyers are necessary (and have a monopoly on)33 squarely
legal services. Through these necessary legal services, lawyers
presumably acquire significant information about the client and
the deal. Their involvement in non-legal work may produce economies of scope—it is sometimes more efficient for an existing advisor to pick up additional tasks than to get a new advisor up to
speed.34

30. Gilson, supra note 1, at 244, 296–306.
31. One indication that lawyers maintain their central roles in M&A transactions is the sustained scholarly interest in the topic. See supra note 3 (citing
legal scholarship examining the central role of deal lawyers). The legal trade
press also suggests that M&A practice remains a prominent part of large-firm
practice. See CITI HILDEBRANDT, 2019 CLIENT ADVISORY 8 (2019), https://
www.privatebank.citibank.com/ivc/docs/2019CitiHildebrandtClientAdvisory
.pdf [https://perma.cc/85ST-EPK7] (“Law firm leaders identified M&A/transactional work as the primary driver [of revenue growth in 2019].”).
32. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 494.
33. State laws prohibit the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers. See
e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125–33 (2018).
34. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 494 (discussing the hypothesis that lawyers create economies of scope); Gilson, supra note 1, at 290, 298 (discussing
economies of scope).
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Lawyers might also build valuable reputations through performing traditional legal work and other tasks.35 These reputations might enhance trust between the buyer and seller as the
lawyer has something to lose by becoming involved with an unworthy client.36 In other words, lawyers can grease the wheels of
transactions by lending their reputation to a client.
Recently, Professor Elizabeth De Fontenay emphasized another important attribute—market knowledge.37 Lawyers build
valuable precedential databases through involvement in a high
volume of deals. Whether through formal studies, knowledge
management personnel, or ad hoc searches of document management systems, law firms house a great deal of nonpublic information on transactions. This insight might aid in the design of
deal documents, as clients seek advice on “what’s market.”38
One could also take a more skeptical view of lawyers’ staying
power. One could look at the expansive role of lawyers as simply
more evidence of agency costs in the lawyer-client relationship.
Because of information asymmetry between lawyer and client,39
perhaps clients have a difficult time discerning the proper role
of lawyers, monitoring their work, and preventing lawyers from
padding their bills with inefficient nonlegal work.

35. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 493 (characterizing reputational intermediation as “the most agreed upon scholarly theory of the value added by
transactional lawyers”); Okamoto, supra note 3, at 18 (providing on overview of
a theory of reputational intermediaries based on the work of Gilson and others);
Gilson, supra note 1, at 290, 298 (discussing the value of reputation). For a discussion of reputational intermediaries more generally, see Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984).
36. See Okamoto, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing the conditions under
which reputation can act as an effective commitment or bond).
37. See De Fontenay, supra note 3, at 396 (“[L]aw firms that repeatedly
engage in the same type of high-stakes transactions acquire private information
about the range of plausible deal terms and their current market prices that
other players cannot replicate.”).
38. See id. at 396 (“This expertise in the ever-changing, ever-expanding set
of ‘market’ deal terms provides clients with a valuable bargaining advantage in
deal negotiations.”).
39. See id. at 399 (“The law firm-client relationship poses the classic agency
problem: the principal (here, the client) lacks complete information about the
agent’s (the law firm’s) performance of its duties, which allows the agent to act
to some degree in its own interests at the expense of the principal’s.”).
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II. A CASE STUDY: RWI
RWI presents a valuable case study of the scramble among
deal professionals. As Griffith describes, RWI presents a meaningful change to a core component of the M&A deal process.40
And this transformation is led in part by nonlawyer deal professionals, raising at least the possibility of an encroachment on the
traditional role of M&A lawyers.
To better assess the implications for lawyers, this part
draws from Griffith’s account, publicly available practitioner
materials, and original interviews to describe RWI in its current
form. This account supplements Griffith’s study by focusing specifically on the roles of deal professionals.
A. BASICS
As Griffith reports, RWI was rare, at least in the U.S., until
about five years ago.41 The growth of RWI in the U.S. is closely
associated with a boom in the private equity sector.42 With a
large number of carriers now offering the product,43 it is cur-

40. See supra note 10.
41. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1877 (showing a pronounced increase in
acquisition agreement references to RWI starting in 2014); supra note 9 (citing
practitioner materials describing the rapid increase in RWI).
42. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1907 (“RWI is predominantly used in private equity deals, often when private equity is on both sides of the transaction.
Moreover, survey respondents overwhelmingly ranked private equity first in
driving the use of RWI.”); supra note 8 (reporting use of RWI in a high percentage of private equity transactions).
43. See Interview with Interviewee #1, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #1] (estimating “three or four credible players” in
2014 and 20–25 currently); Interview with Interviewee #2, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #2] (estimating
over 20 insurers or underwriters currently); Interview with Interviewee #3,
Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #3] (estimating five RWI carriers in 2015 and over 20 currently); Interview with Interviewee #9, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #9] (estimating 25–27 RWI carriers in the
current market); Interview with Interviewee #12, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #12] (estimating 24
“markets” for RWI); Jeffrey Chapman, et al., Representations and Warranties
Insurance in M&A Transactions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE. (Dec.
11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/11/representations-and
-warranties-insurance-in-ma-transactions/ [https://perma.cc/7AFZ-22VB] (“As
RWI has gained market acceptance over the last few years, a significant number
of new insurers have entered the RWI market.”).
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rently a competitive market with declining premiums and expanding coverage.44
A typical RWI policy in today’s market has the following attributes:
• The buyer as insured party, receiving coverage for
breaches of the seller’s reps.45
• Coverage (the insured amount) equaling 10% of the deal
price, roughly corresponding to customary caps on indemnification in non-RWI deals.46
• A premium, paid up front, equal to 2.5-3% of the coverage amount.47
• Exclusions for certain reps, such as unfunded pension
liabilities.48
• Exclusions for anything known by the buyer at the time
of closing, such as matters listed on the seller’s disclosure schedules.49
• A retention (deductible) of approximately 1% of the
transaction amount, which is often allocated between
the buyer and seller in the acquisition agreement.50
44. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (discussing the effects of competition
on premiums); Interview with Interviewee #5, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with
author) [hereinafter Interviewee #5] (discussing the effects of competition on
premiums).
45. Seller-side policies are also available. Under this form of policy, the
seller remains fully liable for breaches of reps under the acquisition agreement,
and the policy backstops those obligations. These policies are currently rare. See
Griffith, supra note 5, at 1866 (reporting that over 90% of policies sold in recent
years are buyer-side policies); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (estimating that
95% of policies are buyer-side); Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (describing sellerside policies as rare).
46. See Griffith, supra note 5,at 1867; Steven Lee & Ai Tajima, M&A
Trends: Representations and Warranties Insurance, GOODWIN INSIGHTS FOR
PRIVATE EQUITY & M&A (Mar. 22, 2018) (reporting information from a survey
of 75 private equity firms).
47. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1867; Chapman, supra note 43; Lee, supra
note 46; Verdesca, supra note 9.
48. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1868(noting that standard exceptions are
narrowing); Lee, supra note 46; Verdesca, supra note 9.
49. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1868; Chapman, supra note 43, at 2; Lee,
supra note 46.
50. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1867–68; Lee, supra note 46; Verdesca,
supra note 9. Sources also refer to increasing prominence of “no survival deals”
that completely relieve the seller of liability under the representations and warranties, as is typical in public company acquisitions. See, e.g., Griffith, supra
note 5, at 1866; Lee, supra note 46 (discussing “no indemnity” deals); Verdesca
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Insurers are developing new products intended to complement RWI. These policies might offer coverage for known claims,
reps typically excluded from RWI policies, or other forms of liability under an acquisition agreement such as break-up fees.51
RWI might therefore be viewed as part of an emerging class of
“transactional liability” insurance. But for now, RWI is the core
product.
B. ANATOMY OF AN INSURED DEAL
It typically takes about two weeks to negotiate, underwrite,
and finalize (“bind”) an RWI policy.52 Over that period, the buyer
will interact with an array of deal professionals. In order to better define their roles, this part describes the key phases of an
insured deal: 1) initiating a proposal, 2) negotiating a policy, 3)
incorporating the policy into the acquisition agreement, 4) due
diligence, and 5) claims resolution.
1. Initiating a Proposal
The first step is engaging a broker to solicit proposals from
insurers. Several insurance brokerage firms maintain teams primarily dedicated to RWI.53 These brokers are often former M&A
lawyers.54 They cultivate relationships with insurers, leading
supra note 9 (describing insurers’ increasingly willingness to eliminate seller
liability). But interviewees describe the typical policy as still having a retention
amount. See Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (reporting limited experience with
no-survival deals); Interview with Interviewee #6, Anonymous Lawyer (on file
with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #6].
51. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (discussing additional forms of policies that have evolved around RWI, such as coverage for tax exposure or pending litigation); Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (discussing other “transactional
products”); Interview with Interviewee #10, Anonymous Insurance Professional
(on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #10] (discussing insurance for
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and other dealrelated liability); Interview with Interviewee #11, Anonymous Lawyer (on file
with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #11] (describing new transactional liability policies).
52. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (reporting that the total time to obtain a policy is now down to a week to 10 days); Interviewee #5, supra note 44
(reporting that it takes about two to three weeks to obtain a policy).
53. See, e.g., Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing a broker’s RWI
group); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (describing a broker’s M&A division).
54. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing how former corporate lawyers with experience in “the trenches” formed an RWI broker group); Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (indicating that most RWI underwriters are former
deal lawyers); Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (suggesting that experience as an

86

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[104:75

M&A law firms (as referral sources), and private equity firms (as
potential clients).55 Once engaged, the broker’s duties run to the
buyer seeking coverage.56
The broker compiles basic information about the buyer,
seller, and the deal. The broker provides this information to insurers to obtain proposals outlining pricing and basic terms such
as the retention amount and standard exclusions.57
When selecting among these proposals, buyers will consider
a number of factors. Besides pricing and the scope of coverage,
buyers think ahead to potential claims. An in-house lawyer for a
frequent acquirer explains that an insurer’s willingness and
ability to pay claims and pre-existing relationship with the buyer
weighs heavily in selecting among proposals.58 A number of
sources cite an emerging claims history (i.e., willingness of insurers to pay claims) as a significant factor in RWI’s recent
growth.59
2. Policy Negotiation
Once the buyer selects among the proposals, the buyer and
insurer negotiate the policy. RWI policies are relatively bespoke.
An RWI is not a read-only document with limited modification

M&A lawyer is necessary for a career as an RWI broker); see also Verdesca supra note 9 (“Many of the large national insurance brokerages have specialized
units that deal with reps and warranties insurance. These units, for the most
part, are run not by ‘insurance people’ but by former M&A lawyers who left
private practice to become dedicated resources at the brokerages.”).
55. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing brokers’ relationships
with law firms and educational efforts); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (discussing marketing efforts of brokers); Interview with Interviewee #7, Anonymous
Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #7] (discussing attendance at M&A lawyer conferences).
56. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43.
57. See Richard D. Harroch, David E. Weiss, & Richard V. Smith, A Guide
To M&A Representations And Warranties Insurance In Mergers And Acquisitions, FORBES.COM (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/
2019/01/23/guide-mergers-acquisitions-representations-warranties-insurance/
#192bffcf67f3 [https://perma.cc/N9Q2-KF26] (discussing information included
in a request for proposal for RWI insurance).
58. See Interviewee #6, supra note 50.
59. See Chapman, supra note 43 (noting that “the stereotype that it is more
difficult to collect under as RWI policy than under a customary seller indemnity”
has been “broken” as insurers started paying out claims); Verdesca supra note
9 (summarizing claims experience reported by two large insurers); Wang, supra
note 9, at 4.
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through pre-set endorsements.60 One interviewee explains that
RWI “is never as rote as renter’s insurance.”61 Buyer’s counsel
will mark up an RWI policy like any other deal document.62
That said, market conventions are emerging. Industry publications list “standard” exceptions, policy features, and price
ranges.63 Commentators describe nuanced custom emerging on
some issues, such as whether an insurer will cover multiplied
damages.64
Buyers may have several advisors for the policy-negotiation
phase. First, M&A lawyers have gained experience reviewing
policies.65 Second, as described more fully below, firms increasingly feature practice groups with dedicated RWI specialists who
assist conventional M&A lawyers with policy negotiation.66 Finally, brokers assist in negotiating policies.67
At this point, there is some overlap between the role of lawyers and the role of brokers. Each brings something different to
60. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 at 4; see also De Fontenay, supra note
3, at 406 (“Consumer insurance contracts, for example, may have terms that are
substantively identical from one insurer to the next and are never negotiated
with the consumer.”).
61. Interviewee #5, supra note 44.
62. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (discussing which sections of the policy are most heavily commented on).
63. See supra notes 46–50 (describing the “typical” RWI policy based on industry publications).
64. In short, multiplied damages are a form of consequential damages that
insurers initially resisted. Currently, insurers will not specifically exclude such
damages from the policy if buyers do not expressly provide for such damages in
the acquisition agreement. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1869 (“Although DIV/
multiplied damages had formerly been excluded from coverage under RWI policies, the market has now settled on a practice of ‘following silence with silence.’”); Interviewee #7, supra note 55; Lee supra note 46.
65. See Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (“I can certainly markup a rep and
warranty binder.”); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (discussing how M&A lawyers
are learning about insurance); Interview with Interviewee #14, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #14] (stating
that law firms lead policy negotiations).
66. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (observing that RWI groups at law
firms assist in policy negotiation); Interview with Interviewee #4, Anonymous
Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #4] (explaining that RWI groups at firms help negotiate policies).
67. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (explaining that a broker will become
more involved in policy negotiation if buyer’s counsel is not knowledgeable
about RWI); Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (explaining that an underwriter will
negotiate with a broker, rather than buyer’s counsel, as long as the broker is
knowledgeable about RWI).
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the task. Brokers maintain relationships with insurers and so
may have influence with them.68 They also see a larger volume
of policies and so might have a better sense of market trends.69
Lawyers, on the other hand, might benefit from a broader view
of the deal and a healthy economic indifference as to whether a
policy binds.70
3. The Acquisition Agreement
Gilson describes the acquisition agreement between the
buyer and seller as a key artifact of the lawyer’s broader role. It
is perhaps surprising, then, that RWI usually requires only moderate changes to the standard form of acquisition agreement.
To be sure, RWI leaves tracks in an acquisition agreement.
Griffith observes that sellers’ maximum indemnity obligations
go down considerably from the customary 10% to 1%. As Griffith
notes, the 1% number corresponds to the typical RWI retention
amount, suggesting that the parties allocate the retention
through the indemnity.71 In Griffith’s data set, escrow accounts
and baskets also scale down, suggesting they are used to allocate
responsibility for the retention.72
Griffith notes more subtle influences. When insurers are
footing the bill, sellers are more likely to concede some buyerfriendly terms such as generous materiality scrapes, undisclosed
liability reps, and multiplied damages.73 These findings are significant in that they show that “RWI transfers greater liability
risk to the insurer than the typical seller would be willing to
bear.”74 These findings are also consistent with interviewee accounts and practitioner materials that cite the ability to “get better reps” as a selling point of RWI.75
68. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66 (reporting that brokers have the primary relationship with the insurer); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (suggesting
that an M&A lawyer has limited direct interaction with insurers during policy
negotiation); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (describing the “leverage” that brokers have with insurers).
69. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (reporting that a lawyer-turned-broker saw significantly more transactions as a broker); Interviewee #4, supra note
66 (explaining that a large broker will see more deals than a lawyer).
70. See id. (observing that a broker receiving a commission has different
incentives than a lawyer billing by the hour).
71. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1880.
72. See id. at 1880–81.
73. See id. at 1882–86.
74. Id. at 1886.
75. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (stating that a seller “gives a better
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But from the perspective of deal process and professional
roles, it is equally impressive how little changes in the acquisition agreement. As long as the seller retains some responsibility
for a retention amount, the acquisition agreement will still feature a familiar looking indemnification for breaches of reps and
associated caps, baskets, and escrows. Even where the policy
lacks a retention, there is a good deal of risk allocation in the
acquisition agreement. The parties may need to allocate responsibility for known items that fall outside of the policy, specify
whether or not the seller is responsible for claims in excess of the
policy, and work out customary price adjustments for working
capital and the like.76
Perhaps most surprisingly, even the reps in an insured deal
likely look similar on their face.77 One might expect that insurers
would, as a matter of efficiency and risk management, dictate or
standardize the wording and scope of the reps they insure. In the
absence of such insurer control, one might expect moral hazard:
sellers might become extremely generous in making promises for
which insurers are mostly responsible.78 For a number of rea-

rep package” with RWI); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (stating that buyers get
“better reps” with RWI); Interview with Interviewee #13, Anonymous Insurance
Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #13] (reporting that
underwriters see comments of buyer’s counsel on acquisition agreements stating that “we’d expect a more expansive rep because there is rep and warranty
insurance on this deal”); Interview with Interviewee #15, Anonymous Insurance
Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #15] (reporting that
sellers “give better reps” with RWI); Interview with Interviewee #16, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #16]
(reporting seeing drafting notes between buyers and sellers indicating that they
do not need to negotiate certain reps because they will be insured); Interview
with Interviewee #17, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #17] (indicating that sellers give broader reps in insured deals); Interview with Interviewee #18, Anonymous Lawyer (on file with author) [hereinafter Interviewee #18] (indicating that sellers give more fulsome reps with
RWI).
76. See PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURITIES, PURCHASE AGREEMENT: REPRESENTATION & WARRANTY INSURANCE PROVISIONS (2019) (showing
customary changes to an acquisition agreement to accommodate RWI); Interviewee #6, supra note 50; Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (suggesting that overall negotiation time is similar for an insured deal and that the role of the lawyer
will “pivot” to integrating insurance into the deal).
77. As a very rough measure, note that Griffith finds reps and warranties
in insured deals to be similar in length to uninsured deals. See Griffith, supra
note 5, at 1881.
78. See id. at 1874 (defining moral hazard as “the tendency of insurance to
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sons, however, it appears that buyers and sellers still retain responsibility for negotiation of reps in an insured deal.79
First, features of an RWI policy likely constrain sellers from
being overly generous. Most basically, a majority of policies include retentions for which sellers are partly responsible.80 Insurance scholarship has long recognized how deductibles curb moral
hazard.81 In addition, even if insurers do not directly dictate the
wording of representations and warranties, they do have tools to
limit coverage. They can exclude or “write out” entire representations or particular phrasing that they believe fall outside the
customary range for a particular type of deal.82
Second, a number of practical considerations prevent insurers from exerting tighter control of the acquisition agreement. A
key selling point of RWI has been timely underwriting without
significant disruption of existing deal process. Dictating acquisition agreement terms would undermine this goal.83 In addition,
deal professionals do not view representations and warranties as
increase loss by reducing the insured’s incentive to prevent it”).
79. Griffith reports:
Although RWI underwriting generally begins before the acquisition agreement
is finalized, insurers often do not typically comment on acquisition agreements.
They do not mark-up drafts, and were they to do so, their comments would likely
not be taken. Id. at 1892.
See also Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (stating that in North America parties
have little appetite for underwriter comments on reps).
80. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1912 (“Insurers generally manage moral
hazard through the policy’s deductible and limits, terms that effectively allocate
loss to the policy-holder, thereby maintaining ‘skin in the game.’”).
81. For an overview of moral hazard in the context of liability insurance
products, see Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review (Univ. Pa. Inst. for Law &
Econ., Research Paper No. 11-09, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1783793 [https://perma.cc/2XQY-NFPM?type=image].
82. From the insured’s standpoint, “writing out” agreement language is
preferable to excluding the subject matter from the policy. Specific language
that is written out is ignored for purposes of determining insurance coverage,
but the entire subject matter is not excluded from coverage. See Interviewee #5,
supra note 44 (explaining the effect of “writing out” language); Interviewee #7,
supra note 55 (explaining the distinction).
83. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (stating that insurers cannot dictate
acquisition agreement terms because of market dynamics); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (stating that the market is too competitive for insurers to dictate
acquisition terms); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (reporting that buyers and
seller emphasize speed when engaging a broker and that buyers and sellers
would hesitate to work with an underwriter that substantially marked up acquisition agreements).
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one-size-fits all boilerplate. These provisions might appear formulaic, but one would expect a buyer to bolster intellectual property representations for purchase of a tech company and environmental representations for purchase of a smelting operation.
Insurers apparently value the role that experienced counsel can
play in this customizing process.84
In sum, buyers, sellers, and their lawyers still dictate agreement terms, even if insurance shades incentives and insurers
police the outer boundaries of acceptable risk.
4. Due Diligence
Griffith notes that underwriters “diligenc[e] the diligence”
of the buyer rather than performing independent investigations.85 In other words, like the approach to the acquisition
agreement described above, due diligence for RWI “piggybacks”
on the work of the buyer and seller.86 Interviewees use a number
of different phrases to describe this dynamic. One interviewee
describes the custom as “over-the-shoulder diligence.”87 Another
states that the process is designed to “pressure-test” the buyer’s
diligence.88
To start the process, underwriters obtain access to the data
room containing all of the materials that the seller provided to
the buyer in response to the buyer’s diligence request. But underwriters do not generally base their diligence on a de novo review of that information. Instead, they rely heavily on diligence
reports from the buyer’s legal, tax, and other advisors. These reports are provided to the underwriter on a “non-reliance basis”—
underwriters sign a letter acknowledging that the reports cannot
be the legal basis for a claim by the underwriter against the advisor.89
84. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (explaining that deals for unique “fingerprints” and the representations and warranties need to be customized); Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (suggesting that one obstacle to synthetic, insurerauthored, reps is that insurers value the benefit of a seller’s negotiating efforts);
Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that an underwriter wants to see
that the agreement was evenly negotiated).
85. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1894 n. 268 (quoting an interviewee). See also
Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (describing secondary due diligence by underwriters); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (stating
that underwriters are “auditing the buyer diligence”).
86. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43.
87. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66.
88. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43.
89. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing the non-reliance letter);
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After the underwriter and its counsel review these reports
from the buyer’s advisors, the parties and their advisors are
ready for the main event: a “diligence call.” The underwriter and
its counsel ask questions about the scope of the buyer’s diligence
and any identified areas of risk.90 Underwriters are looking for a
disconnect between a seller’s operations and risk profile and the
buyer’s diligence. It would, for example, raise red flags if a seller
had significant stakes in foreign subsidies and the buyer’s diligence was primarily limited to domestic operations.91 If the insurer cannot get comfortable with the scope and quality of the
buyer’s diligence on a particular matter, the insurer might limit
the scope of coverage through writing out language in a representation or creating a new policy exclusion.92
As Griffith notes, there is hanging over this process more
potential for moral hazard.93 RWI policies do not cover liabilities
known to the buyer at closing. What prevents the buyer from
engaging in theatrical due diligence designed to look effective to
the underwriter but unlikely in fact to unearth exclusions?94
Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (describing the customary reports); Interviewee
#9, supra note 43 (describing materials received by the underwriter); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing non-reliance letters).
90. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (describing the diligence call); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (describing the diligence call and non-reliance letters);
Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing the process for a diligence call attended by specialized advisors); infra note 122 and accompanying text (describing the role of underwriter’s counsel).
91. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43; Interviewee #15, supra note 75; see
also Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (explaining that an underwriter is looking
for “adequately scoped” diligence).
92. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43; Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing exclusions based on red flags from diligence).
93. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1912(“[I]nsofar as RWI provides coverage
only for risks that remain unknown, the parties may actively avoid uncovering
information that, once revealed, will be excluded from coverage.”).
94. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating that diligence sometimes
feels “like a game of chicken” because of the temptation to do “lighter diligence”);
Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that some law firms are resisting
producing full diligence reports, and instead proposing to issue only “red flag”
reports, potentially because longer reports will trigger exclusions); Interviewee
#16, supra note 75 (explaining that an underwriter tries to be “alive to the effects of insurance”); Interviewee #18, supra note 75 (suggesting that RWI affects
some private equity firms’ diligence process). However, some interviewees suggest that the amount of diligence by buyer’s counsel has increased as insurers
place increasing emphasis on the lawyer’s written diligence report. See Interviewee #11, supra note 51; Interviewee #12, supra note 43.
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Griffith identifies a number of mitigating factors. Buyers
sign a no-claims declaration at closing; if a liability emerges, an
insurer will “interrogate” the buyer’s knowledge and may void
the policy.95 Less dramatically, coverage limits and retention
amounts reduce incentives to short-arm diligence.96 RWI policies
usually only cover 10% of the purchase price with the buyer often
bearing the cost of failed diligence with consequences below retention amounts or above policy limits.97 Diligence also serves
important business purposes (synergies, integration, and the
like) so it would be shortsighted to play ostrich just to improve
RWI coverage.98
In addition to these mitigating factors, one should not underestimate the extent to which participants in this diligence
process simply believe that over-the-shoulder diligence is effective. How can it be that such a cursory investigation, with at
least ambiguous incentives, is sufficient to take on such considerable risk? One potential clue is the weight that insurers accord
law firm reputation. Interviewees describe prominent advisors
as a kind of lubricant for getting an RWI policy underwritten and
bound, and they note that lesser known advisors add time and
expense to the process.99 The suggestion is that a prominent firm

95. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1915; Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (describing the no-claims declaration); Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (explaining
that an RWI policy is void if there is fraud, and that there is no “mechanism”
for moral hazard except “straight fraud”); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating
that the “loophole is fraud”); Interviewee #4, supra note 66; Interviewee #9, supra note 43.
96. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1912–13.
97. Id. at 1866, 1912–13.
98. See id. at 1914–15; Interviewee #6, supra note 50 (stating that diligence
is about “the validity of the business case”); Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (explaining that concerns other than liability motivate diligence); Interviewee #13,
supra note 75 (explaining that purchasers “don’t want a shitty company at the
end of the day”); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (stating that “it is in the interest of buyers to do good deals” and that buyers “don’t want a shit company”);
Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (explaining that the buyer has to “live with” the
company); Interviewee #18, supra note 75 (indicating that private equity funds
will not skimp on diligence too much because they “still want a quality asset”).
Relatedly, lawyers might worry that a truncated diligence process will result in
a malpractice claim by the client. See Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (discussing
malpractice exposure if a law firm shirks on diligence).
99. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (reporting that underwriters have
“faith in quality advisors” such as “blue-chip law firms”); Interviewee #9, supra
note 43 (explaining that lesser known advisors increase underwriting time and
expense); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that an underwriter wants
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would incur a reputational hit if they pulled punches in insured
deals.100
Finally, this deferential approach to diligence may simply
be a commercial necessity due to time and resource constraints.
As described above, time is of the essence in M&A transactions
and a lengthy additional underwriting process would be unattractive.101 In addition, many underwriters are lean operations.
As background, underwriters are themselves a kind of intermediary, linking buyers to “insurance capital.”102 Underwriters
originate policies and process claims for a fee, but the capital often comes from large insurers such as Lloyd’s of London. Underwriters themselves do not necessarily have the personnel to effectively diligence a large M&A transaction in the time
provided.103
In sum, a number of factors lead to a distinctive kind of diligence. Unlike lawyers asked to give a third-party legal opinion
or underwriters facing liability under federal securities law for a
registered offering of securities,104 RWI underwriters do not perform much original diligence. Instead, they diligence the diligence.

to see “parity between the buyer and seller” and would be concerned about a
small firm representing a founder).
100. See Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (suggesting that underwriters
would be discouraged from working with a firm associated with deals with high
insurer losses). These reputational constraints may extend to sellers as well.
See Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that private equity sellers are
constrained by reputational concerns because they are repeat players); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (stating that reputational concerns of private equity
sellers “checks” moral hazard); Interviewee #18, supra note 75 (suggesting that
private equity sellers value their relationships with insurers).
101. See Interviewee #7, supra note 55 (stating that original diligence would
be “unworkable” and “contrary to the ecosystem”).
102. See Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (explaining that managing general
underwriters source policies for insurance capital in exchange for a fee).
103. See Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (explaining that “time and money”
prevent leanly staffed underwriters from conducting their own diligence); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that underwriters are at a numerical disadvantage when negotiating with M&A law firms).
104. See generally DONALD W. GLAZER, ET AL., GLAZER & FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL OPINIONS (3rd ed. 2008) (discussing customary due diligence practices for
lawyers giving third-party legal opinions); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff,
Underwriter Due Diligence in Securities Offerings, N.Y. L. J., May 27, 1999 (discussing due diligence practices of underwriters of registered securities offerings).
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5. Claims
If all goes well for the insurer, the story ends when the policy
binds. But if a breach of the reps surfaces, the parties described
above re-engage to resolve the claim. Buyers will usually work
through their broker to assert a claim.105 Claims are ultimately
managed by the underwriters.106 The buyer’s law firm might become involved, especially if there are reasons to maintain attorney-client privilege.107 Compared to an escrow in a traditional
(uninsured) deal, there are advantages and disadvantages to
this claims process.
On the one hand, RWI reduces the “social” aspect of postclosing claims. Often, a buyer, especially in the private-equity
context, expects the seller to continue in a management capacity.
It can be awkward to assert a claim in that circumstance, and it
may be easier to bring a claim against an insurance company.108
On the other hand, insurance companies “aren’t looking to write
a lot of blank checks.”109 They are presumably experienced and
sophisticated in responding to claims notices, reserving rights,
and pursuing subrogation rights.
III. EFFECTS ON LAWYERS
Having introduced the cast of characters, this part considers
where lawyers stand in this new deal environment. In short, the
outsourcing of risk to insurance companies has not posed the
substantial incursion one might on first glance expect. Instead,

105. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66; Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (discussing claims advocacy groups within brokers).
106. See Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (estimating that 30% of an underwriter’s time is spent managing claims); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that an underwriter spends significant
time on claims).
107. See Interviewee #4, supra note 66 (discussing privilege considerations);
Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (suggesting that a deal lawyer would work with
firm litigators in handling indemnity claims); Interviewee #17, supra note 75
(reporting that M&A lawyers work “hand-in-hand” with the firm’s litigation
group on post-closing claims).
108. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (discussing the social aspect of bringing claims against a seller); Interviewee #4, supra note 66 (discussing reluctance
to bring claims against sellers); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (explaining that
it may be easier for buyers to bring claims against insurers than founders); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (explaining that RWI helps avoid “undesirable conversations” with founder/managers).
109. Interviewee #4, supra note 66.
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the story of RWI so far underscores the durability of M&A lawyers’ central role. Still, RWI’s future is worth pondering because
it is possible it evolves into a more assertive, and less deferential,
feature of deal process.
A. SO FAR, SO GOOD
Practitioner materials sometimes tout RWI for its ability to
streamline negotiation of acquisition agreements.110 Though
smoother contracting sounds good from the client perspective,
lawyers might not view it the same way. Lawyers, after all, prove
their mettle in part by navigating contracting challenges. Put
bluntly, easier negotiations might mean lower fees.111
It is important, however, to put this potential streamlining
effect in perspective. First, consider only the lawyer’s agreement
design function.112 Even with RWI, there is still significant risk
to engineer. Buyers and sellers will still negotiate and draft indemnities allocating responsibility for retention amounts, special indemnities specifying responsibility for known risks, purchase price adjustments, and associated escrows.113 An
acquisition agreement also allocates another kind of risk—closing risk. The parties must agree on closing conditions, break-up
fees, and the like.114 RWI might reduce the stakes of some nego-

110. See Chapman, supra note 43 (suggesting that RWI can “meaningfully
shorten” and “dramatically simplify” negotiations); Harroch, supra note 57 (suggesting that RWI “simplifies and speeds up” negotiation); see also Griffith, supra
note 5, at 1886 (reporting that survey respondents view RWI as making “acquisition contracting more streamlined”); Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (referring
to streamlined negotiation, especially in no-survival deals); Interviewee #4, supra note 66 (suggesting that RWI can “grease the wheels of negotiation” but also
introduces offsetting complications); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (stating that
a no-survival deal significantly speeds negotiations); Interviewee #14, supra
note 65 (suggesting that RWI means significantly less work at M&A firms because of less negotiating with the seller); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (explaining that private equity funds emphasize speed and certainty in completing
transactions and that RWI is helpful in that regard).
111. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (suggesting that with RWI “you don’t
spend nearly as much on legal costs”).
112. See supra Part I.A.1 (describing the lawyer’s design function based on
Gilson’s account).
113. See supra Part II.C.3 (describing the effects of RWI on acquisition
agreements); see also Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (discussing negotiations
over retention amounts and concluding that overall time spent on negotiation
is similar for an insured deal).
114. John C. Coates IV, M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and
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tiations, but it does not obviate the need to construct a risk-allocation apparatus.
In fact, one can view RWI as an additional transaction (or
two) to engineer. Lawyers must not only draft and negotiate the
acquisition agreement, but also the RWI policy terms and a broker engagement.115 And the lawyer must then consider a series
of questions about the extent to which the policy coverage and
acquisition agreement coordinate.116
Moving beyond agreement design, adding the insurer and
broker to the deal complicates the project-management function.117 RWI means more data room permissions, a longer closing
checklist, a multiparty diligence call, and more redlines.
RWI also adds to the transaction-regulatory function by
bringing insurance law into the mix.118 The average deal lawyer
may not be steeped in specialized legal doctrines governing the
validity, interpretation, and scope of insurance policies, but
M&A departments are heading in that direction. A small but noticeable number of M&A lawyers are re-branding themselves as
RWI specialists, a practice that lies at the intersection of M&A
and insurance law.119
Note too how RWI leans heavily on law firm reputation—a
key attribute of deal lawyers discussed in Part I. Prominent
firms add credence to the reps that lawyers negotiate and the
due diligence reports they create.120 In other ways, brokers are
well positioned to compete for a larger role in agreement negotiation and diligence. In particular, they likely have as much market data as law firms on the topic of post-closing liability.121 But
Patterns of Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
29 (Claire Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (providing an overview of
the content of merger agreements).
115. See supra Part II.C.1&2 (describing the proposal and policy negotiation
phases).
116. See supra Part II.C.3 (describing negotiation of the acquisition agreement).
117. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing the project management function of
deal lawyers).
118. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing the transaction-regulatory function of
deal lawyers).
119. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (describing the interviewee’s transition from M&A lawyer to insurance specialist); Interviewee #4, supra note 66
(describing a career transition from M&A lawyer to insurance specialist).
120. See supra Part II.C.4 (describing the role of law firm reputation in the
due diligence process).
121. See supra note 69.
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perhaps an upstart brokerage group cannot lend a client the
same kind of reputation as a white-shoe law firm.
Perhaps the clearest indication that RWI leaves plenty on
the lawyer’s plate is the new role of underwriter’s counsel. Because of underwriters’ lean staffing, it is standard to charge a
$25,000 to $50,000 underwriting fee used to pay for outside counsel to the underwriter. These lawyers help review a buyer’s diligence reports, participate in the diligence call, and craft exclusions.122
Putting it all together, deal lawyers seem to view RWI as a
re-direction as much as an incursion, even if it does replace or
hasten some traditional functions of deal lawyers. Time saved on
representations and warranties is likely to be spent advising on
other aspects of the deal—break-up fees, closing conditions, and
purchase price adjustments, for example.123 Prominent M&A
firms tout their knowledge of RWI as a way to differentiate
themselves and improve client service by adding a new “tool.”124
As one interviewee explains, “[l]awyers are happy to see” RWI
because it “emphasizes a different skill set within the deal.”125
B. BUT THERE’S A CATCH
It is also worthwhile to think about RWI’s future. Specifically, does RWI have to remain so deferential to the status quo?
From Griffith’s standpoint, the question seems to be
whether RWI has much of a future at all. He considers, for example, whether we are at the top of a cycle that is due for a correction as loose underwriting standards catch up to insurers and
dampen enthusiasm for RWI.126 Several interviewees echo this
122. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (discussing underwriter’s counsel);
Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (describing the role of underwriter’s counsel); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing the role of underwriters counsel).
123. See Interviewee #1, supra note 43 (stating that lawyers “end up spending time on the termination provisions or something like that”); Interviewee #2,
supra note 43 (stating that lawyers find negotiation of reps to be a “slog of a
conversation” and that they still “find ways to deliver value”); Interviewee #12,
supra note 43 (“Lawyers always find a way to recapture time lost.”); Interviewee
#17, supra note 75 (suggesting that RWI allows M&A lawyers to focus on other
“value” such as tax efficiency).
124. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (describing RWI as a “tool for the
client toolbox”); Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (describing RWI as another “tool
in your toolbox”); Interviewee #17, supra note 75 (“We appreciate it as a tool.”).
125. Interviewee #5, supra note 44.
126. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1918–20; see also Interviewee # 1, supra
note 43 (“We don’t know what it looks like in a downturn.”); Interview #2, supra
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concern by noting lax underwriting practices by new entrants,127
increasingly buyer-friendly formulations of reps,128 reluctance
by some law firms to provide fulsome diligence reports,129 and
aggressive claims by some insured parties.130
Griffith also raises interesting questions about the product’s
efficiency from the perspective of buyers, sellers, and their economic stakeholders. As Griffith points out, we usually find insurance where it serves some useful risk-spreading purpose, but
here the ultimate economic stakeholders are diversified public
shareholders and institutional investors who should not be especially risk averse as to a particular deal.131 So what’s going on?
Griffith looks to the inner workings of private equity funds and
hypothesizes that RWI could be either a play by fund managers
to increase their compensation at the expense of investors or a
rational adjustment to fund manager incentives that helpfully
encourages managers to take appropriate levels of risk.132

note 43 (noting that there is a “good trajectory of claims” but that people could
go back to escrows if there is bad behavior in claims); Interviewee #4, supra note
66 (stating that RWI could “fizzle out” if insurers stop paying claims); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (discussing effects of a carrier facing a large claim
because of poor underwriting).
127. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (suggesting that lower quality underwriters will “burn through the market”); Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (noting
that “inexperienced” insurers cover forward-looking reps or “business risks”
that were originally excluded from RWI).
128. See Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (noting that some firms “get aggressive” with the reps and use the existence of RWI as an argument for requesting
a broader rep); see also supra note 75 (describing the effect of RWI on the
breadth of reps).
129. See Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (noting a trend of law firms resisting
producing full diligence reports, and instead proposing to issue only “red-flag”
reports); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (explaining that some law firms propose to provide only red-flag reports rather than full diligence reports); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (observing that RWI’s knowledge exclusion is “shortening the length of diligence reports” and that some firms are hesitating to
provide full written diligence reports).
130. See Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (noting that some insureds assert
questionable claims); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (reporting interactions
with plaintiffs lawyers focusing on RWI insurance claims); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (reporting an increase in lost-customer breaches and expressing
concern that buyers might look to RWI as a source of capital in a downturn).
131. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1889 (noting that only sellers of managerowned firms would be risk averse and that such sellers are rare in insured
deals).
132. See id.
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For purposes of this discussion, we do not need to resolve
these important questions. Even if the underwriting cycle turns,
for example, RWI might change or retreat but would presumably
not vanish altogether.133 As to the internal incentives of private
equity investing, RWI could survive as either a useful adjustment to manager incentives or a persistent agency cost that is
not worth resolving.134 Either way, interviewees generally assume that RWI will have some kind of future based on its potent
effect on competitive sale processes and growing acceptance in
the market.135
If RWI is here to stay, then we should consider how it might
evolve. Imaging this future raises an intriguing possibility—rep
and warranty construction is ripe for technological innovation
and insurers might be better positioned than lawyers to lead
these efforts.
Recall one of the more surprising aspects of RWI. Insurers
do not dictate the wording of the reps for which they assume liability.136 They may police the outer boundaries by excluding or
writing out some individual reps,137 but according to Griffith
standard exclusions are narrowing.138 Nor do insurers seem to

133. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (suggesting that sell-side policies
could become more popular in a downturn).
134. Many agency costs are irresolvable. For example, corporate managers
and corporate shareholders have different appetites for risk, creating agency
costs that can be mitigated but not eliminated. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 51,
70–71 (2015) (discussing incentives resulting from equity compensation to corporate managers).
135. Interviewee # 2, supra note 43 (suggesting that when RWI first came
into use it would “shut down an auction overnight” and that the product has
become sufficiently attractive to withstand a market downturn); Interviewee
#3, supra note 43 (suggesting that RWI has become an “average part of the process” and will persist); Interviewee #5, supra note 44 (stating that RWI is “here
to stay”); Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that buyers and sellers
would not likely go back to indemnities and escrows even in an economic slowdown); Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (suggesting that law firms will continue
recommending RWI because it reduces their malpractice exposure and that a
generation of lawyers will be used to it as a part of standard deal practice).
136. See supra note 79 (discussing the limited role of underwriters in negotiating acquisition agreements).
137. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances
in which an insurer will exclude or write out a rep).
138. See Griffith, supra note 5, at 1868; Interviewee #11, supra note 51 (stating that insurers do not “fly speck” acquisition agreements and have limited
exclusions for coverage).
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exert significant influence over the scope of reps through charging higher premiums for more generous reps.139 In fact, when
Griffith observes RWI having an influence on the acquisition
agreement, it seems to pull in the opposite direction by broadening the seller’s reps.140 On the whole, insurers appear to leave
the acquisition agreement to the lawyers based on a combination
of confidence in the buyer’s and seller’s incentives141 and commercial necessity.142
But perhaps insurers could do better. Consider some of the
limitations of the lawyer-led approach that currently sets the
scope of reps. Start with the example Griffith provides in his introduction. Increasingly, buyers are asking for a rep that “no allegations of sexual harassment have been made to the Company
against any individual in his or her capacity as an employee of
the Company.”143 Buyer’s counsel asks for the rep because highly
publicized examples of recent litigation made some client or lawyer, somewhere along the way, alert to a particular kind of risk.
Now the rep is “market.” Seller’s counsel knows the customary
counter moves, which might include objecting that the rep is
costly to confirm, is ambiguous (what counts as an “allegation”?),
covers matters that the buyer may exacerbate by mishandling,
and simply presents too much risk for the seller. Buyer’s counsel
139. Griffith observes pricing is highly standardized and driven in large part
by competition rather than the wording or scope of the reps. See Griffith, supra
note 5, at 1867 n. 152 (discussing survey results); see also Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (suggesting that pricing is “market-driven” and “not quantitatively
sound”); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (describing RWI pricing as “highly unactuarial” and “not very scientific” as opposed to auto or homeowners insurance); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (suggesting that pricing is more qualitative than “actuarial” or “scientific”). One interviewee suggests that underwriters do offer lower pricing to sophisticated repeat players (such as private equity
sponsors) than to inexperienced founder/managers. See Interviewee #13, supra
note 75. Another interviewee explains that it is difficult to adjust pricing to underwriting risk because price quotes are given in an initial proposal before underwriting is complete. See Interviewee #14, supra note 65. But see Interviewee
#16, supra note 75 (suggesting that underwriters can adjust pricing to the scope
of reps because they have at least an early draft of the acquisition agreement at
the proposal stage).
140. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (discussing findings from
Griffith’s study of acquisition agreements).
141. See supra notes 84, 95–99 and accompanying text (discussing the value
that insurers place on customizing reps through negotiation between the buyer
and seller and the incentives of buyers to verify full disclosure by sellers).
142. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the commercial
necessity of fitting within normal deal process).
143. Griffith, supra note 5, at 1841.
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must advise whether to push for the rep, agree to various qualifications, or ask for offsetting concessions.
Embedded in this negotiation is a series of risk assessments.
But do deal lawyers have the right kind of data or information
to make these assessments? As discussed above, De Fontenay
explores one relevant attribute of deal lawyers—extensive market knowledge.144 A law firm’s experience can be incorporated
into a lawyer’s advice through customary practice, ad hoc
searches of document management systems, deal studies, and
firm forms. But these mechanisms do not systematically collect
outcomes—the frequency and magnitude of claims under a given
rep.145 Deal lawyers see claims on only an ad hoc basis—their
firm might be involved in an indemnification claim and a deal
lawyer might have continued involvement in that part of the representation.146 But as one insurance professional puts it, lawyers
may often be engineering “in a vacuum.”147
Brokers and underwriters, on the other hand, may have better information and motivation for sophisticated data analysis,
and they can use that information to refine risk assessment.148
Like law firms, insurance professionals have copies of acquisition agreements, including reps. In fact, they may see a higher
volume of deals than lawyers.149 They have access to accounting
information and a data room that provides a trove of demographic information—industry focus, ownership structure, firm
age, etc.—that might affect risk assessments.150 Importantly, in-

144. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
145. See Spencer Williams, Predictive Contracting, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 621, 627–29, 685 (2019) (distinguishing between data based on historical
contract terms and data that includes contracting outcomes).
146. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (suggesting that the interviewee had
limited visibility to rep and warranty claims as an M&A lawyer); Interviewee
#11, supra note 51 (suggesting that M&A lawyers will have some visibility to
the claims process because the client will often use the same firm that handled
the transaction).
147. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43; Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (suggesting that very few law firms have the data to make refined predictions about
deal risk).
148. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating that insurers have “so much
data to analyze” that they “can make risk management efficient”).
149. See supra note 69 (reporting that insurance professionals are exposed
to more deals than lawyers).
150. See supra Parts II.C.1&4 (discussing the insurer’s access to information
at the proposal and diligence stages).

2020]

THE SCRAMBLE

103

surance professionals also have extensive information about outcomes such as claims notices and dispositions.151 Crucially, insurers and their underwriters should be especially motivated to
collect and analyze this information because of their direct financial exposure to those claims.152
There would seem to be an opportunity to use emerging data
analytics tools—such as machine learning153 and natural language processing154—to make increasingly refined predictions
about how particular formulations of reps perform under specified conditions. For example, such an analysis could predict the
likelihood that the sexual-harassment rep described above will
result in claims. A similar analysis could be performed for different formulations of the rep that limit coverage to only five years
or qualify the rep to the knowledge of high-level executives. The
analysis could control for relevant firm characteristics—industry, employee count, etc. An insurance company could distill this
information into differentiated premiums based on agreement
language and deal characteristics.
This kind of pricing could produce significant benefits for
both insurance companies and transacting parties (buyer and
sellers). For an insurance company, more discriminating pricing
would first and foremost allow price competition while maintaining acceptable underwriting standards and claims history—in
short, more profits. Taking the thought experiment one step further, insurance professionals could use these analytical tools to
develop ancillary services—assisting with due diligence, for example.155 For buyers and sellers, the benefits could be twofold.

151. See supra Part II.C.5 (discussing the role of underwriters and brokers
in claims management).
152. Even third-party underwriters have financial exposure to claims. They
are compensated based in part on claims experience from deals they underwrite.
See Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (describing third-party underwriter compensation); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (reporting that managing general underwriter compensation is affected by insurer losses).
153. See Williams, supra note 145, at 634 (“Machine learning is a category
of artificial intelligence research that focuses on building mathematical computer models that learn from data to improve over time.”).
154. See id. at 653 (“Natural language processing (NLP) is a category of machine learning research focused on enabling computers to understand natural
language communication.”).
155. One insurance professional suggests that a skeleton crew and technological tools might be suitable to diligence small deals, but not larger deals. See
Interviewee #10, supra note 51.
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First, they might benefit from better pricing for the risk-spreading function for which they already buy RWI. Second, premiums
calculated in this matter might convey important information
about previously unquantifiable matters that could become
sticking points in negotiations. The premium, after all, would
represent the magnitude and probability of undisclosed matters
within the scope of a particular formulation of rep.156 This kind
of residual risk, or in Griffith’s terminology “unknown unknowns,”157 is a type that will otherwise be hazy to both buyer
and seller.158
Armed with this knowledge, we might expect insurers to directly or indirectly exert greater influence over the acquisition
agreement. They might indirectly influence reps by resulting
coverage decisions or pricing. More aggressively, insurers might
offer packages of coverage, including menus of pre-set reps, at
different price points.159 It stands to reason that the party with
the best information will ultimately dictate rep construction, and
at some point that principle may override the inertia of the status quo.
The technological innovation is not as far-flung as it might
sound. In a recent article, Professor Spencer Williams described
an emerging field of “predictive contracting.”160 Using machine
156. The premium would also include other elements. See Griffith, supra
note 5, at 1844 n. 17 (“The insurance premium must incorporate not only the
present value of expected losses but also the insurance company’s costs and
profit margin.”).
157. Id. at 1911.
158. For example, the analysis might result in the same high premium for:
(a) the broad form of sexual-harassment rep described above and (b) a more
circumscribed version of the rep that is limited by time (the previous five years).
The high premium suggests to the buyer that sexual harassment is likely to be
a source of risk. The consistent pricing between the two alternatives suggests
that the risk of claims older than five years is low (so additional coverage for
that period is cheap). In contrast, if the broad form of rep is substantially more
expensive than the narrow form, that suggests that there is meaningful risk of
claims older than five years. Admittedly, the price signal might not always be
so straightforward. If an insurer will cover broad or narrow forms of the rep for
a low premium, that could signal either that sexual harassment is a low risk or
that all forms of the rep produce enough disclosure to surface the risk in disclosure schedules (and therefore take the matter outside of RWI coverage).
159. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (suggesting that menus of representations could be developed with more claims experience and analysis); Interviewee #13, supra note 75 (suggesting that insurers will develop “synthetic reps”
and that buyers will receive “a quote and attached variations with pricing”).
160. Williams defines predictive contracting as “a new method of contracting
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learning and natural language processing, large in-house legal
departments and startups are systematically analyzing contracts, background conditions, and outcomes to improve the design of commercial contracts.161
To be clear, it is uncertain whether the insurance industry
has the capacity and appetite for these innovations. Just as some
commentators question the capacity of law firms to innovate,162
insurers may not prioritize this kind of innovation, especially
while the current RWI product is still growing and competition
for deals remains stiff.163
Moreover, even a more assertive form of RWI would not spell
extinction for M&A lawyers. Presumably, clients would still turn
to lawyers to help select among different pricing options, design
other aspects of the acquisition agreement, handle transactionregulatory work, and manage the deal. What might be lost is a
chunk of agreement design and some kinds of diligence. While
these functions are important to law firms in that they provide
opportunities for training associates and leveraging partners’
human capital,164 they ultimately represent a modest part of the
deal lawyer’s diversified portfolio of functions and attributes.
The incursion into deal lawyers’ design function could be meaningful, but not existential.

in which contract drafters can design contracts using a technology system that
helps predict the connections between contract terms and outcomes.” Williams,
supra note 145, at 621.
161. Williams discusses one especially relevant example. A company named
Kira Systems is developing technology that will “identify the likelihood of litigation risk associated with specific terms in acquisition agreements based on
data of past agreements and litigation.” Id. at 637–38.
162. See Green, supra note 28, at 2 (describing law firms as “notoriously reticent to implement emerging technologies” based on risk aversion and economic
incentives).
163. See Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (suggesting that insurers might be
reluctant to innovate as long as there is “untapped growth potential for incumbents”); Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that intense competition
makes it hard for underwriters to assert more control over reps); Interviewee
#15, supra note 75 (explaining how difficult it is for an underwriter to push back
in negotiations because of the willingness of competitors to insure).
164. See MARC GALANTER AND THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 89–93 (1991) (theorizing that the
principal function of law firms is to maximize the human capital of partners, in
part through pushing work to associates).
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C. SO WHAT?
It is customary to conclude a piece on transactional lawyering with a suggestion for how legal educators can better prepare
future deal lawyers. Past recommendations include teaching
more finance and transaction-cost economics to hone the design
function,165 using the traditional case method to prepare students for transaction-regulatory work,166 and teaching soft skills
to encourage good relations with opposing counsel.167 Because
this essay highlights deal lawyers’ varied roles, it is hard to argue with any of the proposals.
Perhaps the more valuable lesson in this case is to take notice of the starring role played by former M&A lawyers in developing the market for RWI. For RWI to gain acceptance, insurance professionals needed to “speak the language” of deals.168
The RWI universe remains populated largely by former M&A
lawyers now working as brokers or underwriters.169 Interviewees describe experience as an M&A lawyer as being nearly essential for a career on the insurance side.170

165. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 305.
166. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 507–08.
167. See id.
168. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (discussing how former M&A lawyers
had to “roll up their sleeves” and build a product that was compatible with M&A
practice).
169. See supra note 54 (discussing former M&A lawyers who became brokers); see also Interviewee #9, supra note 43 (noting the prevalence of former
attorneys at an underwriter); Interviewee #10, supra note 51 (describing a transition from M&A lawyer to insurance professional); Interviewee #12, supra note
43 (describing a transition from M&A lawyer to underwriter and then broker);
Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing a transition from M&A lawyer to
underwriter); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (discussing a common career path
of M&A lawyer to underwriter); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (describing a
career transition from M&A lawyer to underwriter).
170. See Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that 3–6 years of experience as an M&A lawyer is expected for an RWI underwriter and that nonlawyers and hires directly out of law school are rare). But see Interviewee #13, supra
note 75 (describing a litigation career prior to becoming an underwriter); Interviewee #14, supra note 65 (describing efforts to build a pipeline of law school
graduates but acknowledging the need for M&A experience to lead hard negotiations); Interviewee #15, supra note 75 (discussing an underwriter practice of
mostly hiring out of large M&A firms with only limited hiring directly out of law
school or of non-JDs); Interviewee #16, supra note 75 (describing M&A practice
experience as essential for a position as lead underwriter, but noting some success in training non-JDs and other specialists for other positions on an underwriting team).
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These former lawyers are a JD-advantage success story.171
They seem satisfied with their atypical career path172 even if it
lacks some of the prestige of a large national law firm.173 The
compensation is competitive,174 the hours no worse,175 and I
sensed in them some entrepreneurial pride in having played a
role in building the RWI market.
A key question for law schools is how proactively we should
prepare our students for these kinds of JD-advantage opportunities. Is it just idiosyncratic good fortune that some lawyers find
careers in law-adjacent fields? Or should we be developing curriculum to support the kind of marketing skills exhibited by RWI
brokers and the technical skills necessary for the innovations
contemplated above? Do incoming law students want that kind
of education and are law schools the right institutions to deliver
it?
The answers to those questions are beyond the scope of this
essay. But hopefully the story of RWI will inspire a closer look at
these issues.

171. A JD-advantage job is one for which a law degree is beneficial but not
required. Approximately 15% of law school graduates accept JD-advantage jobs.
See Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, What Do We Know About JD Advantage
Jobs?, NALP (November 2017), https://www.nalp.org/1117research [https://
perma.cc/UY65-SF34].
172. See Interviewee #2, supra note 43 (suggesting dissatisfaction with the
professional role of an M&A lawyer); Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (stating that
the interviewee would recommend working for a brokerage); Interviewee #15,
supra note 75 (reporting that the interviewee is “absolutely” satisfied with a
career as an underwriter).
173. Interviewees note that insurance has higher status in Europe than in
the U.S. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43 (reporting that working in insurance
felt like a “knock down in prestige” and noting different perceptions of insurance
in other countries). One broker explains that you should not expect to be surrounded by “mahogany and scotch” working in the U.S. insurance market. See
Interview with Interviewee #8, Anonymous Insurance Professional (on file with
author). Another interviewee was told that going from law firm to brokerage
was an “off-ramp for your career.” See Interviewee #3, supra note 43.
174. See Interviewee #3, supra note 43; Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting compensation is a little less as an insurance professional).
175. See Interviewee #9, supra note 43; Interviewee #12, supra note 43 (suggesting that quality of life is somewhat better as an insurance professional and
that “people are more fun on this side”).
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CONCLUSION
To date, RWI underscores the durability of lawyers’ central
role in M&A transactions. Lawyers enjoy significant built-in advantages as incumbents. Re-working their customary process
has a high price. On the other hand, if one looks over the horizon,
insurance professionals seem especially well situated to change
the status quo through technological innovation. Given the
prominent role of former M&A lawyers in developing RWI, we
might ultimately think of RWI’s next step as an opportunity for
a broadly defined legal profession.

